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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, in the wake of the atrocities that shocked the world in Srebrenica and 
Rwanda, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: 1 
Of all my aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed 
than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian 
population from genocide or mass slaughter. 
Studies, Commissions and academics have, since 1999, debated how the international 
community should achieve the Secretary-General's goal. One landmark consequence of 
these efforts was the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (the ICISS). 2 The repo1t, released in 2001, advocated the concept of a 
"responsibility to protect" (R2P) in an attempt to redefine and increase acceptance of the 
right of humanitarian intervention, as it was known until then. 
This paper will analyse the doctrine of R2P with reference to the cun-ent 
humanitarian crisis in the Western Sudanese region of Darfur. A 26,000 strong 
peacekeeping force has recently been autho1ised by the UN Security Council to help 
bring peace to this troubled region. 3 This force however, comes after four years of 
international inaction. 
Darfur has been chosen as the test case for R2P in this analysis as, in the w1iter's 
opinion, it presents the most plausible case on the cuITent international scene for 
intervention pursuant to this doctrine. This paper will, therefore, begin by providing an 
overview of the conflict in Darfur and the wider Sudan. It will then endeavour to briefly 
outline the background against which R2P was developed, followed by a comprehensive 
analysis of the intervention aspect of this docnine and its applicability to the cun-ent 
1 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations and Srebrenica "Report of the 
Fall ofSrebrenica" (15 November 1999) A/54/549. 
2 Rep011 of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Th e Responsibility to 
Protect (International Development Research Centre for ICISS, Ottawa, 200 I) www .iciss.gc.ca (accessed 7 
August 2007) [ICISS Rep011]. 
3 UNSC Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) S/RES/1769/2007. 
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conflict in Darfur. It will be shown that the conflict in Darfur presents to the world a 
classic case of R2P and that the international community failed in its responsibility to 
protect. It , therefore, becomes necessary to briefly analyse the possible reasons for such 
a failure and to consider the future of the concept of R2P. Trus paper will focus 
particularly on the difficulties in gaining Security Council authorisation for intervention. 
It will also put fo1ward some suggestions for operationalising R2P in light of apparent 
international apathy in the face of humanitarian catastrophe. 
II THE SUDAN 
The Sudan is the largest count1y in Africa, shaiing its borders with nme 
countries. 4 The population of the country is estimated at 39 million, consisting of 
numerous tribes, religions and languages. In 1956, Sudan gained independence from 
British rule and has since had a tumultuous history of coups d'etat and military regimes . 
The Government of Sudan is cun-ently led by Omar Hassan El-Bashir who took power by 
militaiy coup in 1989. Sudan is one of the least developed countries in the world, 
ranking 141 out of 177 countries on the 2006 Human Development Index,5 despite being 
rich in natural resources. In addition, it has been marred by conflict and violence since 
independence, stymieing development and destabilising the region. Two conflicts in 
particular require additional analysis . 
A The North-South Conflict 
The conflict between the No11h and the South of the Sudan began in 1962 when 
the traditionalist, Christian South rebelled against Government policies that favoured 
Islan1 and Arabic, encouraging their expansion throughout the count1y. After ten years of 
violence, the Addis Ababa Agreement ended the conflict in 1972, and a period ofrelative 
4 Chad, Libya, Egypt, E,itrea, Ethiopia, Kenya , Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the 
Central Afiican Republic. 
5 United Nations Development Programme "Human Development Report 2006" www.undp.org (accessed 
7 August 2007). 
5 
peace followed. 6 However, several factors led to a second North-South conflict, which 
began in 1983. These factors included the discovery of oil in the South and the decision 
of the central Government to declare the Sudan an Islamic republic, thus imposing 
Shari'a law on all Sudanese. The removal of the limited autonomy given to the South in 
1972 under the Addis Ababa Agreement also contributed to the South's reasons for 
rebelling. This second war was ended by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
signed in January 2005.7 During the 22-year conflict an estimated two million people 
were killed and four million displaced from their homes. The UN is cmTently involved in 
monitoring the implementation of the CPA. Although there seems to be general 
compliance with the ceasefire, the peace in this region is still a fragile one.8 
B The Conflict in Darfur 
The conflict in Darfur began in February 2003 when, first, the Sudan Liberation 
Anny and then, the Justice Equality Movement attacked government military 
installations, complaining of disc1imination and oppression of the Darfur region.9 The 
seeds of the conflict are complex. 10 Sources include tribal feuds fuelled by 
environmental problems and a feeling of socio-economic and political marginalisation of 
Darfuris. The Government in Kha11oum attempted to quell the rebel forces by deploying 
Sudanese troops and, more imp011antly, by allegedly arming the Janjaweed militia. 11 The 
6 Addis Ababa Agreement, Ethiopia (27 February 1972). 
7 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement / Sudan People 's Liberation Arn1y, Nairobi (9 January 2005). 
8 UNSC Resolution 1755 (30 April 2007) S/RES/1755/2007. For a brief overview of the progress of the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement see Mariam Bibi Jooma "Darfur Realities: Peace 
and war in the Sudan - An update on the implementation of the CPA" (16 May 2007) Institute for Security 
Studies Situation Report www.iss.ca.za (accessed 7 August 2007). 
9 A detailed history and composition of these two rebel groups can be found in International Crisis Group 
"Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis" Africa Repo1176 (25 March 2004) www.crisisweb.org (accessed 14 
August 2007). 
1° For a detailed overview of the causes of the conflict in Darfur and in the greater Sudan see International 
Commission oflnquiry on Darfur "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General" (25 January 2005) S/2005 /60, paras 40-72 [Commission oflnquiry 
Repo11]. 
11 Kha11oum denies allegations that it supports the Janjaweed. However, there seems little doubt that the 
Janjaweed, at least initially, was backed by the Sudanese Government. See, for example, United Nations 
News Centre "Sudan: Government forces , militias have committed atrocities - UN rappo11eur" (14 July 
2007) www.un.org (accessed 7 August 2007). See also Commission oflnquiry Report, ibid, para 111. 
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tenn "Janjaweed" is an Arabic expression generally meaning "a man (a devil) on a 
horse" , 12 and refers to a loosely organised militia force that has been accused of 
committing many of the atrocities in Darfur. 13 The counter-insurgency campaign of the 
Government focused on attacking communities and civilians suspected of suppo11ing the 
rebel groups , resulting in the present humanitarian crisis in which at least 200,000 people 
have died. 14 An estimated further two million people have been forced from their homes, 
many fleeing to neighbouring Chad. The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 15 concluded 
that while the mens rea element of genocide was not satisfied , violations of other 
international offences that "may be no less serious and heinous than genocide" have been 
committed in Darfur. 16 Indeed , there is clear evidence of a policy directly targeting the 
civilian population. The Commission of Inquiry found that: 17 
[G]ovemment forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks , including killing of 
civilians , torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages , rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfw·. 
The Commission concluded that the government of Sudan had acted in "blatant violation 
of international law" in response to the insurgency in Darfur, 18 and that human rights 
violations, c1imes against humanity, and possible war crimes, have been committed by 
the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed and the rebel groups. 19 The principal 
recommendation of the Commission was that the situation in Darfur be referred to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).20 
12 Commission oflnquiry Report, above n I 0, para JOO . 
13 For a general discussion of the Janjaweed militia see ibid, paras 98-126. 
14 Calculating the number of deaths in Darfur is impossible given the size and inaccessibility of pa11s of the 
region. One of the latest estimates puts excess deaths at "no fewer than 200 OOO ." These figures include 
both direct and indirect deaths: John Hagan and Alberto Palloni "Death in Darfur" (2006) 313 Science 
1578. 
15 UNSC Resolution 1564 (18 September 2004) S/RES/1564/2004 . 
16 Commission oflnquiry Report , above n I 0, 4. For a detailed analysis of the violations of international 
law committed by the pai1ies involved in the Darfur conflict see paras 23 7-418. 
17 fbid , 3. 
18 Ibid , para 628. 
19 Ibid , para 630 . 
20 Ibid , para 64 7. 
7 
III HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The idea of a right of humanitarian intervention is not a new concept. Instances 
of states intervening on proclaimed humanitarian grounds predate Alexander the Great.21 
Often, however, interventions were not purely humanitarian, and the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism was frequently used as a guise for other motives. 22 Nevertheless, prior 
to the signing of the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention justifications were widely 
used, leading some academics to assert that a rule of customary international law 
existed.23 
The establishment of the UN called into question the existence of a doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention because of its express prohibition on the use of force in 
circumstances other than self-defence or pursuant to Security Council authorisation.24 
Commentators are divided on what effect the Charter had on the doctrine. States also 
seemed reluctant to openly rely on the doctrine, meaning that instances of intervention 
based primarily on humanitarianism were rare until the end of the Cold War. Most states 
preferred instead to rely on individual or collective self-defence. Indeed, many 
interventions that may have had a sufficient humanitarian aspect were not argued on 
humanitarian bases, but on the basis of self-defence. Examples of such instances include, 
India ' s invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 , Tanzania' s intervention in Idi Amin's Uganda 
throughout the 1970s, and Vietnam' s intervention into Pol Pot' s Cambodia in the late 
1970s. 
21 Thomas G Weiss Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect 
(2ed, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, United States of America, 2005) 8. 
22 See, for example, Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (International 
Development Research Centre for ICISS, Ottawa, 200 I) 17, quoting Ian Brownlie asserting that "no 
genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred with the possible exception of the occupation of 
Syria in 1860 and 1861" [ICISS Supplementary Volume]. 
23 See for example Lassa Oppenheim and Hersch Lauterpacht (ed) International law (8ed , vol l , 
Longmans Green , London, 1955) 312; Jean-Pierre Fonteyne "The Customary International Law Doctrine 
of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the UN Charter" (I 974) 4 Cal W lnt' I LJ 203 , 235 . 24 Charter of the United Nations I UNTS xvi, art 2( 4) (prohibition on the use of force) , art 51 (the exception 
of self-defence) and Chapter VII (the ability of the Security Council to authorise interventions). 
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A Iraq 
The first post-Charter assertion of a right of humanitarian intervention came from 
Britain as an ex post facto justification for its actions in protecting the Kurds in Northern 
Iraq in 1991. Following the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 , the Iraqi 
government began persecuting the Kurds in the north of Iraq in response to Kurdish 
uprisings. Despite a lack of Security Council authorisation, the United States, France and 
the United Kingdom intervened to protect civilians, imposing a no-fly zone. After the 
invasion, the intervening states appeared to justify their actions on implied Security 
Council authorisation based on Resolution 688.25 This resolution, which was not passed 
under Chapter VII, called on Iraq to end the repression of civilian populations and allow 
access to humanitarian organisations. Later, however, the United Kingdom began to 
make a case for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Eventually, it also suggested 
some criteria upon which humanitarian intervention would be justified.26 This assertion 
by the United Kingdom attracted criticism and little support demonstrating the highly 
controversial nature of the doctrine. 
B Kosovo 
The end of the Cold War created a different dynamic in world order, with more of 
a focus on human rights and the security of peoples. The ensuing years of the 1990s thus 
saw the international community intervene in Somalia, Liberia, Haiti , Sierra Leone and 
Kosovo to avert or quell humanitarian catastrophe. While the Somali and Haitian 
operations were authorised by the UN Security Council, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Kosovo were not, at least initially. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ' s (NATO) 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is the most commonly cited example of humanitarian 
intervention. The members of NA TO launched a bombing campaign against Serbia to 
protect Kosovar Albanians from Serb repression. NATO's principal legal basis for 
intervening was based on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The United 
25 UNSC Resolution 688 (5 April 1991) S/RES/688/1 991. 
26 Geoffrey Marston (ed) " United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1992" (1992) 63 BYIL 615 , 
826 - 828. 
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l(jngdom especially relied on this doctrine. 27 Its position was made clear in its 
submissions to a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee set up to report 
on the legality of the NATO intervention. The British Government stated that in the case 
of "overwhelming humanitarian necessity ... a limited use of force is justifiable as the 
only way to avert a humanitarian catastrophe." 28 Tony Blair also made the British 
Government's position clear in a famous speech to the Chicago Economic Club in April 
1999 .29 Finally, in 2000, the Foreign Secretary developed a set of guiding principles to 
aid in the interpretation of the right of humanitarian intervention. 30 
During the intervention, Russia sought to pass a resolution in the Security Council 
condemning NATO's actions. Only China, Namibia and Russia itself suppo1ted the 
Resolution. The other 12 members, including seven non- ATO states, 31 suppo1ted the 
actions of NATO. Some commentators have asserted that this vote demonstrated " ... 
grudging acceptance that in extreme cases it is legitimate to take measures outside of the 
Council." 32 Coupled with Resolution 1244, establishing an international civilian 
presence in Kosovo, 33 and Security Council actions vis-a-vis Liberia, 34 and Sierra 
Leone,35 the legitimacy ofNATO's actions now seemed undisputed. 
27 For an overview of key statements made by the United Kingdom see Ian Brownlie and CJ Apperley 
" Kosovo Crisis lnquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects" (2000) 49 ICLQ 878. 
28 House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Select Committee "Fourth Repo1i on Kosovo" HC 28 - UII (7 June 
2000) www.publications.parliament.uk (accessed 7 August 2007) para 124 [Fmih Repo1i on Kosovo]. 
29 Tony Blair "Doctrine of the International Community' ' (Hilton Hotel , Chicago, United States, 22 April 
1999). 
30 Geoffrey Marston (ed) "United Kingdom Materials on International Law 2000" (2000) 71 BYIL 517, 
646-649. These guidelines are broadly reflected in the ICISS repo1i discussed intra Part N The 
Responsibility to Protect. 
31 Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil , Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia and Slovenia. 
32 Paul D Williams and Alex J Bellamy 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur" (2005) 36 
Security Dialogue 27, 41. See also, Nicholas J Wheeler "The Humanitarian Responsibilities of 
Sovereignty" in Jennifer M Welsh (ed) Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004). 
33 UNSC Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) S/RES/1244/1999. 
34 UNSC Resolution 1497 (I August 2003) S/RES/1497 /2003 establishing a multinational force for Liberia . 
35 UNSC Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999) S/RES/1270/1999 establishing UNAMSIL. 
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C The State of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo 
The intervention in Kosovo generated a wealth of academic commentary. 
Opinions remain divided over whether or not the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
constituted a valid use of the right of humanitarian intervention. Most academics agreed 
that, strictly speaking, the intervention was illegal due to the lack of Secmity Council 
authorisation. Many argued however, that while not legal, the intervention was 
legitimate and evidence of the re-emerging right of humanitarian intervention as an 
exception to the Charter. 36 Others though, found these arguments for a right of 
humanitarian intervention unconvincing.37 
In April 1999, Yugoslavia brought a case against ten NATO members alleging the 
illegal use of force. 38 The International Court ofJustice (ICJ) denied their application for 
provisional measures , relating to the immediate cessation of the intervention, on the basis 
that p1ima facie jurisdiction on the merits of the case was not established. This 
procedural decision in no way reflected on the legality of NATO's use of force and the 
ICJ did not make a decision in this respect. It did however express concem. 39 Over ten 
years earlier, in the case of Nicaragua v United States, the ICJ had seemed to reject the 
existence of a right of humanitarian intervention as a way of ensuring respect for human 
rights.40 Many commentators have claimed that this assertion is not a definitive rejection 
of the 1ight of humanitarian intervention.41 Indeed, the ICJ also recognised the ability of 
36 See for example, Antonio Cassese "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community" (I 999) JO EJIL 23; 
Bruno Simma "Nato, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" (1999) JO EJIL I . 
37 See for example, Simon Chestem1an "Legality Versus Legitimacy: Hw11anitarian Intervention , the 
Security Council, and the Rule of Law" (2002) 33 Security Dialogue 293; Simon Cheste1111an Just War or 
Just Peace? Humanitarian interl'ention and international Law (Ox ford University Press, Oxford, 200 I), in 
which he analyses the arguments for the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention post-UN Charter 
and concludes that they are unconvincing. See also, Ch1istine Gray international Law and the Use of 
Force (Ox ford University Press, Oxford, 2004 ). 
38 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium) (Yugoslal'ia v Canada) (Yugoslavia v France) 
(Yugoslavia v Gennany) (Yugoslavia v Italy) (Yugoslavia v Netherlands) (Yugoslavia v Portugal) 
(Yugoslavia v Spain) (Yugoslavia v United Kingdom) (Yugoslavia v United States of America) (Provisional 
Measures) [1999] ICJ Rep 259 [Legality of Use of Force]. 
39 Ibid, paras 16-17 . 
40 Milita1y and Paramilita1y Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJRep 14, paras 267-268 and 243 [Nicaragua]. 
41 ICISS Supplementary Volume, above n 22, 19. 
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customaiy law to develop and be modified by changing circumstances in the international 
arena, thus leaving open the possibility of a right of humanitarian intervention 
developing. 42 Problematically, however, as noted above, there have been very few cases 
in which states have relied primarily on a doctrine of humanitarian intervention to justify 
their actions.43 This does mean that such a customary law rule could not develop. Many 
developments in the international community in recent years have aimed to bridge the 
gap between the morality and legality of humanitarian intervention. 
IV THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
A From Humanitarian Intervention to R2P 
Thus, the issue of humanitarian intervention presented a seemingly unresolvable 
dilemma between the prohibition on the use of force (a jus cogens norm) 44 and the 
fundamental 1ight of all peoples to basic human rights. It was with this dilemma in mind 
that fo1mer Secretaiy-General Kofi Annan challenged the international community: 45 
[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, ho~ 
should we respond to a Rwanda , to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? 
In response, the ICISS was set up by the Canadian government. While other 
commissions were also set up to explore this issue, most notably by the Dutch and Danish 
governments, 46 the report of ICISS is regarded as the most comprehensive and has 
subsequently received the most recognition. The ICISS repo1t was released in December 
200 I and substantially changed the way intervention on humanitarian grounds is now 
42 Nicaragua , above n 40, para 207. 
43 See intra Part III Humanitarian Intervention. 
44 Nicaragua, above n 40 , para 190 . A jus cogens nom1 is a 1101111 from which no derogation is pern,issible. 45 Kofi A Annan "We the Peoples: The Role of The United Nation i,1 the 21 st Century" (3 April 2000) 
A/54/2000, 48 ["We the Peoples"]. 
46 The study commissioned by the Danish Government through its think-tank DUPI, and the report of the 
Netherlands Government through its Advisory Council on International Affairs. 
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viewed. The report essentially refocused humanitarian intervention away from a "right" 
to intervene to a "duty" to protect. 
B The ICISS Report 
The ICISS report made two conceptually important contributions to the 
humanitarian intervention debate. First, the ICISS changed the focus of the debate from a 
"right to intervene" to a "responsibility to protect" incumbent on states when mass 
atrocities are occurring within the territory of another sovereign state.47 This change in 
tern1inology helped refocus attention on the victims of atrocities and took some of the 
"heat and emotion out of the policy debate."48 
Secondly, the ICISS sought to redefine sovereignty. The essence of the report 
was not to weaken the concept, but to advocate a transition "from sovereignty as control 
to sovereignty as responsibility."49 Sovereignty entailed a dual responsibility: to one's 
citizens, and to the international community. Consistent with the norm of non-
intervention in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, individual states have the pnmary 
responsibility to protect their citizens. 50 However, the international community has a 
"fallback" responsibility, which is engaged when a state is either unwilling or unable to 
exercise its responsibility to protect.51 
The repo11 stressed that the responsibility to protect of the international 
community went beyond intervention to halt human rights violations. It entailed three 
responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to rebuild. 52 Indeed, in the ICISS's view, the 
most important of these responsibilities was not that of reaction, but of prevention. 53 
Given the highly contentious nature of the tight to react by military intervention, the 
47 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 2.4. 
48 Gareth Evans "From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect" (2006) 24 Wis Int'l LJ 
703 , 708. 
49 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 2.14 . 
50 fbid , para 2.8 and para 2.30. 
51 Ibid , para 2.31 . 
52 Ibid, para 2.29. 
53 Ibid , para 7.15. 
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ICISS spent considerable time preparing a set of guidelines for when such intervention 
would be appropriate. It should be stressed that the essence of R2P is not on legitimising 
military intervention. While such intervention can be taken pursuant to the doctrine, it is 
essentially a last reso11 in "extreme and exceptional cases" , 54 following international 
action in political, diplomatic or economic fields. 
The ICISS set out six criteria to justify the use of force to protect civilians in the 
case of"large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing": just cause, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means, reasonable prospects and right authority. 55 These will be discussed 
in more detail below with regard to the situation in Darfur. 
C International Acceptance of R2P 
The tenninology of R2P has been used in several international documents since 
2001 and has received substantial suppo11 from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). 56 The concept was endorsed in the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change. 57 This report also approved of the criteria for legitimacy 
presented by the ICISS, even recommending that such criteria be considered by the 
Secuiity Council in any context involving authorisation of the use of force, not just for 
interventions based on humanitarian concerns. 58 
Importantly, the Outcome Document of the World Swnmit by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005 adopted the concept,59 representing, in theo1y, wide supp011 for the 
concept in the international community. Kofi Annan also approved of R2P in his report 
In Larger Freedom.60 
54 Ibid , para4 .10. 
55 Ibid , XII. 
56 For a list ofNGOs that have expressed support for the concept ofR2P see, Responsibility to Protect: 
Engaging Civil Society www.responsibilitytoprotect.org (accessed 23 August 2007). 
57 Report of the Secretary General ' s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility" (2 December 2004) A/59/565 , para 203 [High Level Panel Report]. 
58 Ibid, para 207. 
59 UNGA "2005 World Summit Outcome" (24 October 2005) A/RES/60/1, paras 138-139. 
6° Kofi A Annan "In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (21 March 
2005) A/59/2005, para 135. 
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The Security Council has also used the language of R2P in many resolutions, the 
first being resolution 1674 pe11aining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. 61 
Resolution 1706 in relation to Darfur was the first time the UN Security Council made 
reference to R2P with respect to a specific country. 62 
V THE APPL/CATION OF R2P IN DAR FUR 
Given the acceptance, in theory, of R2P, the intensity of the crisis in Darfur, and 
international unwillingness to act during the first four years of the conflict, it will now be 
considered whether the doctrine of R2P would have been applicable to this crisis. 
A WltoseR2P? 
The primary responsibility to protect Darfuris lies with the Sudanese Government. 
It seems clear that Khartoum has failed in this responsibility. It initially armed and 
suppo11ed the Janjaweed militia and has done nothing to disaim them despite undertaking 
to do so on several occasions.63 Kha11oum has been obstrnctive in peace talks and shows 
little sign of living up to its obligation to protect Darfuris. 64 Darfur is clearly one of the 
situations envisaged by the ICISS when they spoke of governments unwilling to protect 
61 UNSC Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) S/RES/1674/2006. 62 UNSC Resolution 1706 (31 August 2006) S/RES/ 1706/2006. This resolution refers to paragraphs 138 
and 139 of the "2005 World Summit Outcome", above n 59, which describe the responsibility to protect. 63 The government in Khartoum has agreed to disarm the Janjaweed in the following instances: N'Djamena 
ceasefire agreement of8 Ap1il 2004; the N'Djamena agreement of25 April 2004; the 3 July 2004 
communique signed with the UN; the 5 August 2004 Plan of Action signed with tJ1e UN; the 9 November 
2004 Protocol on Security Arrangements signed at tJ1e AU-led Abuja talks; and in tJ1e Darfur Peace 
Agreement of5 May 2006. The Security Council has also directed Khartoum to disann militias in 
Resolutions 1556 (30 July 2004) S/RES/1556/2004, 1564 (18 September 2004) S/RES/1564/2004, 1574 
(19 November 2004) S/RES/1574/2004, and 1591 (29 March 2005) S/RES/1591 /2005. 
64 House of Commons International Development Committee "Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to 
protect" HC 67-I (30 March 2005) (The Stationary Office Limited, London, 2005) [House of Commons 
Repo11 on Darfur] paras 20-22 (noting the obstructiveness of the Sudanese government in allowing 
humanitarian access) and para 95 (noting the difficulties in dealing with the Government of the Sudan) . 
For an overview of the actions to address human rights violations taken by the Sudanese goverrunent, see 
Commission oflnquiry, above n 10, 108-123. The general conclusion of the Commission was that these 
efforts have been half-hea1ted and ineffective. 
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their civilians. The collective responsibility of the international community is therefore 
engaged. 
B The International Response to the Crisis in Darfur 
On 31 July 2007, the Security Council authorised the world's largest 
peacekeeping force to be deployed in Darfur. 65 While this indicates that the international 
community has now begun to take responsibility for the people of Darfur, this action 
comes over four years after the conflict began. It is also interesting to note that 
Resolution 1769 does not explicitly refer to the concept ofR2P.66 
Until Resolution 1769, the international response to Darfur amounted to mere 
rhetoric of its R2P. It would , however, be misleading to say that nothing was done by the 
international community over Darfur. Individual states and the UN provided 
humanitarian assistance to the region, repeatedly called for peace negotiations and action 
on the pai1 of the Government of Sudan, provided financial support to the Afiican Union 
mission, established a commission of inquiry and refen-ed the situation to the ICC. 
However, these actions were feeble in the face of the grave atrocities being committed in 
Darfur. Darfur was not even mentioned by the Security Council until 11 June 2004 in 
Resolution 1547, over a year after the conflict began.67 
1 The African Union in Dar.fur 
The involvement of the Afiican Union (AU) in Darfur began in 2004, pursuant to 
the N'Djamena Peace Agreement. Under this Agreement, the Afiican Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) was mandated to send in ceasefire monitoring troops. However, it was 
cleai· from an eai·ly stage that pai1ies to the conflict did not intend to comply with the 
ceasefire. This forced the AU to reassess AMIS's mandate, which saw it develop from 
65 UNSC Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) S/RES/1 769/2007 . 
66 Ibid . R2P is implicitly referred to in that this Resolution re-affirms Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) 
SIRES/ I 674/2006, which explicitly used the language o fR2P . 
67 UNSC Resolution 154 7 ( 11 June 2004) S/RES/1 54 7 /2004 . 
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an observer mission to a peacekeeping one. 68 From this time onwards, AMIS was 
gradually expanded to its current 7,000 troops. The AU has made considerable effort 
although it is effectively too under-funded and understaffed for such a mission. 69 It 
seems that the international community used the AMIS force as a reason not to get their 
own hands dirty. Recognising the deficiencies of AMIS, suggestions for an AU-UN 
hybrid force began in early 2006. Finally, on 31 July 2007, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1769 authorising an AU-UN hybrid force of26,000 peacekeepers.70 
C Would the Concept of R2P Provide a Basis for Intervention in Darfur? 
During the four years of international inaction over the atrocities occun-ing in 
Dafur, many NGOs and other organisations called for intervention in the region to halt 
the suffering of civilians. It therefore seems necessary to assess whether or not an 
international force would have been justified in intervening in Darfur. 
The ICISS established several criteria to detem1ine when using the norm of R2P 
to intervene in another state would be acceptable. For any international force or 
individual country to intervene pursuant to this doctrine, they would need to show that 
the c1iteria had been met to validly claim that the intervention was legal. These crite1ia 
were also accepted by the High Level Panel as being relevant to any type of 
intervention.71 
68 African Union Peace and Security Council "Repm1 of the Chairperson of the Commiss ion and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur" (22 June 2007) 
PSC/PR/2(LXXIX) . 
69 For an analysi s on what AMIS would have needed to be successful see Paul D Williams "Military 
responses to mass killing: the Afiican Union mission in Sudan" (2006) 13 International Peacekeeping 168; 
International C1isis Group 'The AU 's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps" (6 July 2005) Africa Briefing 
28 www.crisisgroup.org (accessed 19 August 2007). 
70 UNSC Resolution I 769 (31 July 2007) S/RES/1769/2007 . 
71 High Level Panel Report, above n 57 , para 207 . 
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J Just cause 
The threshold for R2P was set by the ICISS at actual or apprehended "large scale 
loss of life" or "large scale ethnic cleansing". In the ICISS's view, this amounts to 
"se1ious and irreparable haim".72 The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur found that a 
policy of genocide had not been pursued in Darfur. 73 Nevertheless, they did conclude 
that equally serious international offences had been committed.74 The ICISS noted that 
the just cause threshold would be satisfied if there was large scale loss of life, "whether 
the product of genocidal intent or not." 75 They, however, expressly made no attempt to 
quantify "lai·ge scale", noting that in most circumstances there will be no disagreement.76 
With approximately 200,000 deaths and at least two million displaced persons it seems 
cleai· that the threshold of "large scale loss of life" set by the ICISS has been satisfied for 
quite some time. 
2 Right intention 
Any intervention must be caITied out with the "right intention", meaning that the 
p1imary purpose must be to "halt or ave11 human suffering".77 Fernando Tes6n argues 
that provided the intention is to rescue "victims of tyranny", the fact that the intervening 
country had other motives is irrelevant so long as they do not negate the intention to 
rescue. 78 This seems also to be the position of the ICISS, which recognises that mixed 
motives are inevitable in international relations.79 
The main concern of the major powers with respect to intervening in Sudan is that 
they be viewed as either pursuing a neo-colonialist agenda or seeking to control Sudan's 
72 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 4.18 . 
73 Commission oflnquiry, above n 10, 124-132. 
74 Ibid , 4 . 
75 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 4 .20. 
76 Ibid , para 4.21. 
77 Ibid , XII. 
78 Fernando R Tes6n Humanitarian Inten 'ention: An I11qui1 y into Law and Morality (3ed, Transnational 
Publishers, New York, 2005) 385. 
79 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 4.35 . 
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oil resources. The ICISS notes that concerns over ulterior motives may generally be 
alleviated if the action taken is multilaterai.80 Additionally, as a means of ensuring 1ight 
intention , the ICISS identifies assessing whether the intervention is supported by those it 
is aimed at saving.81 In Darfur, there is clear evidence among civilians of support for 
action by the international community to ensure their effective protection.82 The ICISS 
also notes the position of neighbouring count1ies vis-a-vis an intervention as being a 
factor to consider. 83 Chad is the country that shares the largest border with Darfur. The 
violence has spread to Eastern Chad, and scores of Darfuri refugees are living in camps 
on the Chadian border. Chad has condemned many times the violence in Darfur and 
relations between the two countries are strained, with Chad accusing Khartoum of arming 
the Janjaweed militia. Now fighting a rebellion of its own on the Eastern border, 
Chadian President, Idriss Deby, recently said that he supported the idea of a European 
Union peacekeeping force in the East to help minimise the spill-over of violence from 
Darfur. 84 This does not necessarily mean that Chad would support an international 
intervention into Darfur itself. However, the international community may have been 
able to persuade Chad to agree. 
3 Last resort 
Military intervention must be a "last resort" .85 This will be the case where all 
other non-military methods of resolution have been exhausted. As Gareth Evans notes 
" [t]his guideline was not intended to mean that every non-military option must literally 
have been t1ied and failed." 86 Given the urgency with which many of these situations 
80 Ibid , para 4.34 . 
81 Ibid . 
82 United Nations Human Rights Council "Report of the High-Level Mission on the situation of human 
rights in Darfur pursuant to Human Rights Council decision S-4 /101" (7 March 2007) A/HRC/4/80, para 
70 . 
83 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 4.34 . 
84 The Chadian President agreed in principle to such a force after talks with French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy on 19 July 2007: "Chad: President Agrees to Admit European Force" (20 July 2007) New York 
Tim es New York . 
85 This reflects tl1e well-established international law principle of necessity. For a comprehensive analysis 
of the law of necessity see Judith Gardam Necessity, Proportionality and th e Use of Force by States 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004 ). 
86 Evans, above n 48, 710 ; ICISS Report, above n 2, para 4 .37 . 
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arise, if a ce1tain method is not employed, intervention may still be justified if there is a 
reasonable belief that that method would have failed to resolve the conflict. Peace talks 
have been attempted several times in Darfur. The African Union has a force of 7 ,OOO 
troops on the ground attempting to restore peace and, before Resolution 1769, the United 
Nations had tried time and time again to get the Government of Sudan to agree to the 
deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. However, these attempts were not 
coupled with coercive instruments such as effective and targeted sanctions against 
Khaitoum. 87 It must be considered whether effective sanctions would have been 
necessai-y before any intervention. 
(a) Sanctions 
The ICISS identifies many measures short of military intervention such as aims 
embai·goes, financial or trade sanctions and restrictions on diplomatic representation and 
travel. 88 Sanctions are seen as a valuable international tool in forcing governments to 
change their behaviour. In the case of Darfur, the Secmity Council was unacceptably 
slow to use this tool. Indeed, sanctions were not contemplated by the Council until 
Mai·ch 2005 , and sanctions against specific individuals were only imposed in Ap1il 2006. 
Even then, the sanctions applied to only four individuals: a low-level air force 
commander; a Janjaweed commander; and two rebels.89 
The international community seemed determined to secure the consent of 
Khartoum before any so1t of international force was sent in. In this situation, more 
tai-geted and effective sanctions need to be applied in order to force agreement. Such 
agreement will only come when allowing an international force is less detiimental than 
the effect of the sanctions placed upon the countI-y. While sanctions through the Security 
Council on Sudan have proved difficult due to China's interests in the Sudan, individual 
countries can and should have imposed their own sanctions on Khaitoum. It is impo1tant 
87 David Mepham and Alexander Ramsbotliam "Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the Responsibility 
to Protect in Africa" Institute for Public Policy Research www .ippr.org (accessed 12 August 2007) 27. 
88 IC IS S Rep 011, above n 2, paras 4 .1-4 .9. 
89 UNSC Resolution 1672 (25 April 2006) S/RES/1672/2006. 
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that sanctions imposed are targeted so as to mitigate as much as possible the harm to the 
general population. 
It may be that targeted sanctions would have forced Khartoum's consent at an 
earlier stage. However, without the support of China, it seems unlikely that truly 
effective sanctions could have been imposed. Given the reluctance of the Chinese to take 
action against the Sudan, and a history of unfulfilled promises on Kartoum 's pait, it is at 
least arguable that this mechanism would have failed to resolve the conflict. 
(b) The International Criminal Court 
It must be considered whether possible proceedings before the ICC weigh against 
an ai·gument for intervention. The situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC in March 
2005 ,90 and on 27 Februaiy 2007 the ICC identified two suspects to appear before the 
Comt.91 
The supplementaiy volume to the ICISS repo11 notes that international criminal 
prosecution may in fact be better regarded as a preventative mechanism or post-conflict 
method of reconciliation, than as a reactionaiy tool.92 The supplementary volume also 
notes that prosecution is ineffective in the face of humanitarian catastrophe given how 
time-consuming it is.93 The final repo11 of the ICISS discusses criminal prosecution as a 
"direct prevention method". 94 It may be ai·gued that international prosecution should be 
regai·ded as having a more indirect effect on the prevention of conflict. The effect would 
be more in detening future conflicts, than directly preventing the escalation of existing 
ones. Additionally, the concept of R2P should be interpreted in the context of the 
90 UNSC Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) S/RES/1593/2005. 
91 Warrants have been issued for Ahmad Muhammad Harun (fo,mer Minister of State for the Interior of the 
Government of Sudan and currently Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs) and Ali Muhammad Ali 
Abd-AI-Rahman (a Janjaweed leader). 
92 ICISS Supplementary Volume, above n 22, 22 . 
93 Ibid . 
94 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 3 .30 . 
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increased international focus on the secu1ity of individuals,95 and the primary concern 
should therefore be to stop actual human suffering. Thus, it is submitted that prosecution 
would not and should not impact on the necessity of the international community to 
intervene as, in reality, the prosecution of a limited number of individuals will do little to 
alleviate the human suffe1ing that is occurring in Darfur. 
4 Proportional means 
Any intervention on the basis of R2P must employ "proportional means", 
meaning that intervening states must use the least destrnctive means to realise their goal 
of protecting the civilian population.96 In this context, it is clear that an aerial bombing 
campaign, like the one conducted by NATO in Kosovo, would not be an appropriate 
means in Darfur, as it would most likely cause more destruction and create more refugees. 
On the other hand , it is clear that the AU force of 7,000 is insufficient. A larger force 
with a clear mandate for human protection is more likely to be able to provide the 
necessary protection for civilians without disproportionately aggravating the 
humanitarian situation. 
The UN has recently autho1ised a force of 26,000 peacekeepers, comprising up to 
19,555 military personnel and 6432 civilian police, to be deployed in Darfur. The force 
will be the world's largest peacekeeping force. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
Resolution 1769 authorises the use of force in self-defence, to ensure the free movement 
of humanitarian aid workers, and to protect civilians under attack. 97 Due to Chinese 
reluctance to authorise any so11 of intervention in Darfur, the Resolution was significantly 
watered down in order to gain the Chinese vote. This meant that the mandate to disann 
the waITing forces was removed. This has led c1itics to argue that the 26,000-strong force 
will be unsuccessful in halting the violence. 
95 As opposed to the traditional view that security was a state-centred concept. See for example, The 
Human Security Report 2005 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) www.humansecurityreport.info/ 
(accessed 14 August 2007); United Nations Development Programme " 1994 UN Human Development 
Repo11" www.undp.org (acce ed 14 August 2007). 
96 The concept ofpropo11ionality is a well-established principle in international law. For a comprehensive 
analysis of proportionality in international law see Gardam, above n 86. 
97 UNSC Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) S/RES/1769/2007, para 15 . 
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5 Reasonable prosp ects 
The ICISS notes that "some human beings simply cannot be rescued except at 
unacceptable cost . . . in such cases, however painful the reality, coercive military action 
is no longer justified."98 Before intervening it must be believed that the intervention has 
reasonable prospects of success and will not create or inflame a larger conflict. 99 In this 
respect, the international community would need to consider whether or not intervention 
in Darfur could reignite the North-South conflict in Sudan. However, this consideration 
must surely also be weighed against the possibility of non-intervention causing 
destabilisation of the wider region and igniting conflicts in neighbouring countries. In the 
case of Darfur, Chad is especially at risk because of the large number of refugees 
crossing the border and indeed is already dealing with unrest on the Eastern border with 
Darfur. 
6 Right authority 
Finally, and perhaps the most problematic of all , the intervention must have the 
"right authority" . The ICISS notes that there "is no better or more approp1iate body than 
the Secmity Council to autho1ise military interventions for human protection 
purposes." 100 
Security Council authorisation may be sought in one of three ways : by request for 
such authorisation, by the Council conside1ing the issue on its own initiative, or by the 
Secretary-General rai sing the issue under his powers in Article 99 of the Cha1ter. 101 
Regional organisations may also seek authorisation from the Security Council under 
Chapter VIII of the Chaiter. 102 
98 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 4.41 . 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid, XII. 
101 Ibid, para 6.15 . 
102 Ibid, paras 6.31 - 6.35 . 
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Gaining Security Council authorisation for any :intervention in Darfur would be 
difficult, simply because, all other potential hurdles aside, of China's oil interests in 
Sudan. Additionally, authorising intervention in Darfur would mark a new era for the 
Secu1ity Council as it would be the first time they had authorised intervention in another 
fully functioning state on humanitarian grounds, without that state's consent. 103 
One of the main issues facing the ICISS was the veto power of the permanent five 
members of the Secuiity Council and the very real possibility that this could effectively 
frustrate efforts to invoke R2P in specific situations. The ICISS did not see the answer to 
this issue as being in the creation of a different basis for legality. 104 Instead, they 
considered ways in which the Security Council could be made more effective. Most 
impo11antly, they suggested that the "Permanent Five" should agree to a code of conduct 
that they abstain from using their veto when action is needed to stop or avert 
humanitarian ctises. 105 However, any refonn of the UN system to modify the veto power 
has been the subject of discussion in the UN for several years now. Accordingly, it will 
be oflittle help for those suffering in Darfur as consensus may be years away. 
Given the tardiness of the Security Council in authorising intervention in Darfur, 
this may be one of the situations the ICISS was refening to when it remarked: 106 
It is a real que tion in these circumstances where lies the most hann: in the damage 
to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that 
order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by. 
It seems that a good case could be made for intervention in Darfur on the 
p1inciples stated by the ICISS. The international community, therefore, seems to have 
failed in its responsibility to protect. Some reasons for this failure will now be briefly 
considered. 
103 ln this respect the intervention in Somalia may be distinguished. See intra Part VD 2 United ations 
Intervention in Somalia. 
104 ICISS Report, above n 2, paras 8.4 and 6.14. 
105 Ibid, para 6.21. 
106 Ibid, para 6.37. 
24 
D Why has the International Community Failed to Protect in Darfur? 
1 What did Kosovo have that Dmfi,r doesn 't? 
It was mentioned above that the ATO intervention in Kosovo seems to have 
been accepted as a legitimate humanitarian intervention by the international 
community. 107 However, if assessed according to the criteria laid down by the ICISS, it 
seems clear that this intervention would not have been justifiable. This is so principally 
because it is not clear whether the "just cause" threshold had been meet. Did the 
mistreatment of the ethnic Albanians by Milosevic amount to actual or apprehended large 
scale loss oflife or ethnic cleansing? Even if it did , the 78-day bombing campaign could 
not be regarded as proportionate given the destruction it caused. This begs the question: 
what did Kosovo have that Darfur doesn't? 
The primary explanation why the international community chose to intervene in 
Kosovo and not in Darfur seems to be strategic considerations. Kosovo was set against 
the backdrop of the Yugoslav wars that had been causing unrest on the fringes of Europe 
since the early 1990s. The crisis in Darfur, however, is just another removed African 
conflict in the eyes of many Western nations. Accordingly, the prospect of renewed 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia was of significantly greater strategic significance to the 
NA TO forces that intervened than Darfur is to the powerful states that have the capacity 
to intervene. 
The different political landscape is also relevant. Notably, powerful countries 
have been reluctant to inte1vene in Africa for fear of being viewed as pursuing a neo-
colonialist agenda. 108 Such a fear did not exist in the Balkans. 
107 See intra Part III B Kosovo. 
108 See, for example, S Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J Thielking and Thomas G Weiss "The Responsibility to 
Protect: is anyone interested in humanitarian intervention?" (2004) 25 Third World Qua11erly 977 . 
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2 United Nations intervention in Somalia 
In 1992, the Security Council authorised for the first time intervention in another 
state on the basis of humanitarian protection. Prima facie, this seems like a valuable 
precedent for intervening in Darfur. However, a closer analysis reveals some 
fundamental differences between the two cases, which may explain to some extent the 
different reaction to the crisis in Darfur. The most important of which is that Somalia 
had no effective government in control of the country at the time of intervention. 
Kha.11oum, on the other hand , is a functioning Government, and has the capability to 
protect its citizens, even if only by accepting an international force. Accordingly, David 
Vesel argues that there is an important difference between humanitarian intervention in 
failing states and humanitarian intervention in states unwilling (but capable) of protecting 
their citizens. '09 His view is that "intervention in failing states can be legitimised and 
legalised without destroying the principles of sovereignty or international consensus", 11 0 
largely because in those cases intervention is far less of a threat to international peace and 
the principle of sovereignty. 111 This argument is also alluded to by the ICISS. 112 Vesel 
suggests that a principle of customary international law allowing intervention in failing 
states is emerging. 113 However, he views intervention in fully functioning states as much 
more contentious. Because Khai1oum has the ability to control Darfur, though not the 
will, the case of Somalia is unhelpful as a precedent for intervention in Darfur. 
109 David Yesel "The Lonely Pragmatist : Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World" (2003-2004) 
18 BYU J Pub L 1, 53-55. 
11 0 Ibid, 55. 
111 Ibid,54. 
112 lCISS Repo11, above n 2, para 4 .22; ICISS Supplementary Volume, above n 22, 10. 
113 Yesel , above n 109, 54. See also Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith "Humanitarian Intervention and Just 
War" (1998) 42 Mershon International Studies Review 283,291; William I Zartman ( ed) Collapsed States: 
th e disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority (Boulder, Lynne Reinner Publishers , 1995); Gene 
M Lyons and Michael Mastanduno "State Sovereignty and International Intervention" in Gene M Lyon 
and Michael Mastanduno (eds) Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995) 264 ; Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst ''Somalia and the Future 
ofHumanitarian Intervention'' (1996) 75 Foreign Affairs 70 , arguing that the international community 
should be able to declare a state "bankrupt" and go in to restore order. 
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3 Contempora,y concerns over intervening 
Bellamy and Williams also suggest three contemporary reasons why intervention 
has not been pursued in the case of Darfur: western abuse of humanitarian justifications 
dwing the war on terror; the relative impo11ance of Darfur compared to the war on terror; 
and the potential for military intervention to jeopardise the Peace Agreement between the 
No11h and South of Sudan. 114 
Indeed, the war on terror, and more specifically the invasion of Iraq, had 
unfortunate ramifications for the acceptance of the doctrine of R2P. 11 5 With the United 
States relying to a certain extent on humanitaiian justifications, opponents of R2P began 
to fear that the doctrine could be used to justify Iraq-style interventions. In reality, the 
intervention in Iraq was not a case ofR2P. The criteria set out by the ICISS is reasonably 
naiTow and it would be difficult to argue that the "just cause" threshold, or the 
requirement of "right intention" , had been met in the case of Iraq .116 Nonetheless, the 
intervention in Iraq did have se1ious consequences in terms of mobilising international 
will to intervene in other states. 117 
It seems, therefore, that the key ingredient is political will. The ICISS addressed 
the issue of mobilising political will both domestically and internationally. 11 8 Sadly, 
however, there is no quick fix. As one commentator has remarked , "the sad reality is that 
Darfur simply does not matter enough, and the Sudan matters too much, for the 
international community to do more to stop the atrocities." 119 
11 4 Williams and Bellamy, above n 32 . 
11 5 For further discussion on the effect of the war on terrnr on R2P see, Welsh , above n 32; Kenneth Roth 
"War in Iraq : Not A Humanitarian Intervention" Human Rights Watch World Report 2004 www.hrw.org 
(accessed 24 August 2007). 
116 Alicia L Bannon "The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Question of 
Unilateralism" (2006) 115 Yale L J 1157, 1163 ; Thomas G Weiss "The Sunset of Hwmmitarian 
Intervention? The Responsibility To Protect in a Unipolar Era" (2004) 35 Security Dialogue 135, 148-149. 11 7 Alex J Bellamy "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian 
Intervention after Iraq" (2005) 19 Ethics and International Affairs 31 , 3 7-40; Wi Ilia ms and Bellamy, above 
n32, 40 . 
118 ICISS Report, above n 2, paras 8.8 - 8.23. 
11 9 Nick Grono "Briefing - Darfur: the International Community's Failure to Protect" (2006) 105 Afiican 
Affairs 621,628. 
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VI A FUTURE FOR R2P? 
A An Emerging Doctrine? 
What does Darfur tell us then about the future of the doctiine of R2P? The ICISS 
claimed in its report that, while insufficient to amount to a principle of customary 
international law, state practice and Security Council precedent suggested an emerging 
principle of R2P. 120 However, it seems at present that the doctrine is most useful as 
political rhet01ic. There are essentially two ways in which the doctrine of R2P could 
become a legal principle of international law; either through its acceptance in a 
multilateral treaty, or through development into a rule of customary international law. 
Many creases need to be ironed out before any such development could occur. This 
highlights what the writer considers to be the two main impediments to the practical 
adoption of R2P in international affairs: authorisation and operational capacity. This 
section will assess what, if anything, can be done to improve the adoption of R2P in these 
areas. 
B Authorisation 
The UN Secmity Council is considered by the ICISS to be the most appropriate 
body to authorise interventions pursuant to R2P. 121 This may be so in theory, but in 
practice the Security Council is often unable or unwilling to act in c1ises that would 
otherwise waITant international intervention. The decision to save suffering peoples from 
genocide or crimes against humanity should not be detennined by power politics. 
Additionally, so long as the veto power continues to be used in these situations, the 
legitimacy of the Council remains questionable. The "Permanent Five", who hold the 
effective decision-making power in the Security Council, are unrepresentative of the 
international community, comprising of members of only three of the world's six 
continents. Most impo1tantly, there is no representative from Africa, where a significant 
120 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 2.24 . 
121 Ibid, XII and para 6.14. 
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number of modem conflicts take place. This takes the decision to use R2P squarely out 
of the hands of the people upon whom it will impact the most. 122 Including African 
representation in decisions to use R2P would, in most instances, make its employment 
more difficult initially. It would, on the other hand, lend more legitimacy to such 
decisions, aiding in the development of the norm. 
In support of Security Council authorisation, it may be argued that acting without 
the support of the Security Council could threaten the international rule of law and the 
peace and security of the international community. Conversely, if the doctrines of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention are strictly applied by the Security Council, the 
resulting number of unchecked internal conflicts could also threaten international stability. 
1 Other options for authorisation 
The answer of the ICISS to this problem is to improve the functioning of the 
Security Council. 123 While the Security Council may be the most desirable body for 
authorisation, change to the decision-making powers and procedure of the Council to 
improve its effectiveness is unlikely, at least in the near future. Such change requires 
consensus, of which there is little evidence at present. 124 If the international system is to 
retain (or perhaps regain) its credibility, the morality of an intervention must be 
considered paramount to Secmity Council autho1isation, especially when intervention is 
blocked by the veto of a state pursuing its own interests. If the international community 
is serious about protecting civilians from gross violations of human rights, other sources 
of authorisation must be considered. This paper will now consider two options: the 
viability of the "Uniting for Peace" procedure and the possibility of setting up a new 
body to deal with R2P. 
122 Mepham and Ram botham, above n 87 , 43 . 123 ICISS Repo11, above n 2, para 6.14. 124 The High Level Panel na1Towed the options for reform to two , but was unable to come to consensus on 
one or the other: High Level Panel Repo11, above n 57 , paras 244-260. 
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(a) "Uniting for Peace" 
As noted by the ICISS, 125 one option for autho1isation in the face of Security 
Council inaction is for the General Assembly to recommend military action under the 
"Uniting for Peace" procedure. 126 Indeed, the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, in its report on the intervention in Kosovo, suggested that the illegality of that 
intervention could have been avoided had the NATO countries followed this 
procedure. 127 Under this Resolution, where the Security Council is unable to act due to 
the constraints of the veto power, the General Assembly may make "appropriate 
recommendations to members for collective measures . . . to maintain or restore 
international peace and secu1ity." 128 Such a session may be called pursuant to either a 
request by seven members of the Security Council or by the majo1ity of members of the 
UN. 129 This procedure does not technically authorise an intervention due to the mere 
recommendatory nature of the General Assembly's powers. However, such a decision 
would legitimise the intervention given the amount of states in favour. This procedure 
requires a two-thirds majo1ity, which, as the ICISS noted, will be difficult to obtain 
except in exceptional circumstances, given the opposition of most African and Asian 
states to intervention. 130 However, this appears to the w1iter to be consistent with the 
intention of the ICISS in terms of intervention which , in their own words, should only be 
used in "extreme and exceptional cases". 131 
(b) An independent body 
It may be that a separate body will need to be set up to consider when 
interventions will be necessaiy under R2P if the Security Council and the General 
Assembly procedures prove unsatisfacto1y. Ideally, this body will be pai1 of the UN 
system, and representative of the international community. It will autho,ise interventions 
125 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 6.30 . 
126 UNGA Resolution 3 77 (V) (3 November 1950) . 
127 Fourth Report on Kosovo , above n 28 , para 128 . 
12 UNGA Resolution 377 (V) (3 November 1950) para I . 
129 [bid. 
130 ICISS Report, above n 2, para 6.30. 
13 1 lbid, para4 . IO . 
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on the basis of consensus. Given the seriousness of intervention in other states it may be 
desirable that a two-thirds majority be required. This body could act as a substitute to the 
Security Council. It would only be seized of a certain matter where the Council either 
fails or is unable to act in a timely fashion on an issue engaging R2P. This would 
maintain international order to a ce11ain extent while still overcoming the problem of 
Secu1ity Council inaction. 
It is in the interests of those states dete1mined to uphold the norm of R2P to find a 
way to implement it consensually. If it is left to individual states or "coalitions of the 
willing", it is more likely to be abused , 132 which will inevitably lead to a reassertion of 
the p1inciple of absolute sovereignty. It is also in the UN's own interests to establish an 
effective mechanism to deal with R2P, for if the UN fails to authorise intervention in a 
situation that warrants outside involvement, it risks significant damage to its 
credibility. 133 Recent suggestions for a separate UN Special Adviser for R2P indicate 
commitment, by the Secretary-General at least, to find a way to implement R2P in 
· 134 practice. 
2 Unilateral action 135 
While the concept of R2P does not mle out unilateral action in circumstances of 
extreme humanitarian catastrophe, such action remains, and probably will remain, the 
most contested exercise of the doctrine. Therefore, the best way to ensure the emergence 
of a mle or guiding p1inciple of R2P would be to emphasise a collective application of it. 
If the catastrophe in question is tmly grave enough to meet the "just cause" threshold, 
then it is highly likely that at least a small group of states will take their responsibility to 
protect those civilians se1iously. Thus, a coalition or regional organisation could invoke 
132 House of Commons Repo11 on Darfur, above n 64 , para 100. 
133 Gareth Evans "Banishing the Rwanda Nightmare: The Responsibility to Protect" (31 March 2004) 
www.pbs.org (accessed 22 June 2007). 
134 United Nation News Centre "Secretary-General Appoints Francis Deng of Sudan as Special Adviser for 
Prevention of Genocide, Mass Atrocities" (29 May 2007) www.un.org (accessed 12 August 2007) . 135 Some commentators have used the term "w1ilateral action" to refer to all action which is not authorised 
by the Security Council. This paper uses the tenn in the more traditional sense of the word to refer to any 
action taken by a single state. 
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R2P as a basis for intervening to protect those civilians, lending more legitimacy to the 
claim of humanitarianism and in tum aiding in the acceptance of R2P as a principle of 
international law. Therefore, phrasing R2P as a doctrine which, potentially allows 
unilateral action, is counterproductive in te1ms of its acceptance internationally, and 
probably will not be necessary. 
C Operational Capacity: Implementing R2P in Practice 
The crisis in Darfur has highlighted one of the principal difficulties with R2P , 
namely the question of who will carry out operations deemed to fall within the doctrine 's 
realm. R2P will not become a valid rule, guiding principle or docttine of international 
law until the problem of operational capacity is addressed. Presently, the international 
community simply does not have the capacity to deploy rapidly to ave11 humanitarian 
catastt·ophe. This deficiency must be addressed. Kofi Annan ale1ted the international 
community to the need to address this problem when he asked "whether the institutions 
and methods we are accustomed to are really adequate ... " 136 Darfur demonstrates clearly 
that they are not. While the UN Secmity Council has recently passed Resolution 1769 
authorising a 26,000 strong peacekeeping force in Darfur, 137 UN officials expect that it 
will take a year for the entire force to be deployed. In the meantime, thousands more 
Darfuris could die. The UN needs to be able to react faster to crises such as the one in 
Darfur. 
One of the main problems is that more powerful countties, such as the United 
States, are generally unwilling to conttibute tt·oops to UN activities and instead tend to 
donate money, leaving troops to be sourced mainly from smaller countries. 138 Along 
with the protracted nature of national deployment decisions, this contributes to the 
difficulties the UN faces in deploying rapidly into c1isis zones. It is submitted that some 
so11 of pemrnnent or semi-pennanent force could enhance the effectiveness of the UN 
136 Kofi Annan , quoted in Felicity BatTinger "Annan warns of World 'Cri i "'(31 July 2003) New York 
Times New York Al6. 
137 UNSC Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) S/RES/1769/2007. 
138 Repo1i of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (21 August 2000) A/55/305 - S/2000/809, para 
I 03 [Brahimi Repo1i]. 
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and operationalise the concept of R2P. There are several possibilities for such a force. 
This section will briefly outline two options for the intemational community: the use of 
p1ivate military companies (PMCs) and the development of UN rapid reaction capacity. 
1 Private Milita,y Companies 
One option to overcome issues of operational capacity is for the UN to contract 
out some of its military services to PMCs. The issue of using "mercenary forces" to 
enhance UN capacity to react was raised during the roundtable consultation conducted by 
the ICISS in Ottawa, and deemed an imp011ant issue to consider. 139 It was not, however, 
addressed in the ICISS's final report. If used, such contracting would be based on 
necessity and employed as a last resort when national governments are unable to offer 
troops. This essay does not seek to analyse the legal , moral or ethical issues smrnunding 
the use of PM Cs in conflict. 140 It is undeniable that PM Cs have serious disadvantages, 
namely sun-ounding the inadequacy of legal regulation of their actions. However, if an 
international regulatory scheme were set up to regulate such companies they could 
provide the link necessary to shift R2P from the realm of political rheto1ic into reality. 
2 Development of UN rapid reaction capacity 
The implementation of R2P relies on there being capacity, at the international 
level, to deploy rapidly into crisis zones. Any force that needs several months to fully 
deploy will do little to save suffering civilians as thousands more could die in the inte1im. 
Indeed , a decision to intervene could even anger the waiTing factions and result in an 
increase in violence. It is essential , therefore, that a rapidly deployable force be 
developed within the UN system, or alternatively within regional organisations. 
139 ICISS Supplementary volume, above n 22, 353. 
14° For discussion on the debate surrounding the use of private military companies in conflict zones, see the 
work of Peter Singer. For example, PW Singer "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military 
Firms and International Law" (2004) 42 Colum J Transnat'I L 521 . 
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The deficiencies of the UN in this respect have been evident for some time now. 
Support for some form of rapid reaction capability intensified in the early 1990s, leading 
to several attempts to enhance the capacity of the UN. Some of these attempts will be 
considered briefly. 
(a) United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) 
UN SAS was established as part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 
1994. 141 The system works on the basis of conditional commitments of resources by 
member states, with agreed response times. 142 Fonner Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
however, recognised the constraints of UNSAS in 2000, labelling it "unpredictable" . 143 
Essentially, the deployment of UNSAS is still dependant on national political will with 
the conditional agreements of the states involved providing no guarantee that troops will 
be available for any specific operation. 144 Indeed, in 1994, in the face of genocide in 
Rwanda, not one of the 19 states that had pledged supp01t for UNSAS agreed to 
cont1ibute troops to the mission in Rwanda. 145 
(b) Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations 
(SHRIBRIG) 
In 1996, a Danish-led initiative established SHRIBRIG, which exists as a 
peacekeeping brigade that can be made available to the UN within 15-30 days. 146 Troops 
are sourced from the militaiies of each paiticipating country. The pool of possible troops 
exceeds those needed in case count1ies subsequently become unwilling to provide the 
14 1 See the United Nations Standby A1i-angement System website www.un.org (accessed 13 August 2007). 142 Ibid. 
143 "We the Peoples", above n 45 , para 225 . 
144 Boutros Boutros-Ghali ''Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General 
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations" (3 January 1995) N 50/60 - S/1995/1, 
11 , para 43 ; Brahimi Report, above n 138, para 84. 
145 Boutros-Ghali , Ibid; H Peter Langille Bridging the Commitm ent-Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements 
and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment (The Center for United Nations ' Refonn Education, 
New York, 2002) 40. 
146 Multinational Standby High Readiness B1igade for United Nations Operations website http://shirbrig.dk/ 
(accessed 9 August 2007) . 
34 
number of troops pledged. 147 Despite this caution, the deployment of the brigade still 
relies on national political will. 
Additionally, the resources of both UNSAS and SHIRBRIG are to be used only 
for Chapter VI peacekeeping purposes. 148 Strictly speaking then, these resources could 
not be used for an intervention pursuant to the doctiine of R2P where the operation 
demands a mandate wider than Chapter VI. 
(c) Future proposals 
It seems that the only way to develop an effective rapid deployment force will be 
to overcome the issue of political will by removing the process from national 
governments. One proposal by a group of scholars led by Robert Johansen is to establish 
a pennanent UN service comprised of volunteers called the UN Emergency Peace 
Service (UNEPS). 149 This proposal is not the only one of its kind with many similar 
proposals sharing similar features. 1so This paper takes the example of the UNEPS to 
illustrate the potential of such a force. 
Such proposals have proved popular in theory. For example, a Bill expressing 
suppo11 for the UNEPS is currently before the United States Congress. 1s1 Additionally, 
147 langille, above n 145 , 44. 
148 "United Nations Standby Arrangements System Description" www.un.org (accessed 9 August 2007). 149 Robert C Johansen (ed) A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity (World Federalist Movement, United States of America, 2006). The te1m volunteer is 
somewhat mis leading. It means that the troops volunteer to be in the service, as opposed to compulsory 
troop donations. The troops will be paid . See also, Rebecca J. Hamilton "The Responsibility to Protect: 
From Document to Doctrine - But What oflmplementation?" (2006) 19 Harv Hum Rts J 289, 295-296. 150 Other propo als include, The United Nations Legion of Professional Volunteers, the Pe1111anent Rapid 
Deployment Brigade, the UN Constabulary and the Standing UN Rapid Deployment Police and Secw·ity 
Force. For more information on these proposals see, Langille, above n 145 , 64-106. 151 H. Res . 180 [l 09°'] was proposed on 17 March 2005 but was cleared from the books at the close of the 
109 th session of Congress. A Bill to the same effect, H. Res. 213 [110 th], was introduced on 5 March 2007 
and is cu1Tently in the first stage of the legislative process , having been refe1Ted to the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. The title of the Bill reads, "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that a 
United Nations Emergency Peace Service capable of intervening in the early stages of a humanitarian crisis 
could save millions of lives, billions of dollars, and is in the interests of the United States." 
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both the European Union and the AU have agreed to establish similar forces that could be 
called on in the event of a humanitarian emergency. 152 
The primary advantage of such a force is its permanent existence outside of 
national forces, as troop deployments are often delayed by lengthy national decision-
making processes. However, such a force will not absolve national governments of their 
responsibility to react to international crises. The proposed UNEPS would be designed as 
a complementary rapid reaction force to other UN, national or regional responses to 
conflict. 153 The proposal notes that the Security Council would be the preferred source of 
authorisation for the deployment of UNEPS. It, nevertheless, agrees with the ICISS 
report that where the Security Council is unable to act, other sources of authorisation may 
be acceptable. 154 
It has also been noted that having a rapid reaction capacity in the UN would have 
a deterrent effect, providing "a psychological, but tangible influence of a UN that was 
actually ready to prevent bad leaders from engaging in bad behaviour." 155 
D Will these Changes Result in the Adoption of R2P? 
A rapid reaction capacity could provide the timely response necessary to 
successfully avert humanitarian crises. Neve1theless, if the problem of authorisation is 
not addressed, an increased capacity to intervene in conflicts will only serve a dete1Tent 
purpose, the effect of which will be se1iously weakened if it becomes clear that the force 
is in fact unable to be deployed. 
152 "EU Approves Rapid Reaction Force" (23 November 2004) BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 
14 August 2007); Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (9 July 2002) www .african-union.org (accessed 30 August 2007) art 13. 
153 Johansen , above n 149, 27. 
154 Ibid, 28. 
155 Peter Langille "UN Efforts and Options to Improve Diverse Peace Operations: Protection of Civilians, 
Prevention of Am1ed Conflict, Modest Enforcement and Rapid Deployment" Commissioned Paper 
prepared for the World Federalist Movement Canada's Annual Conference "UN Refonn to Address The 
Responsibility To Protect" (McCord Museum of Canadian History, Montreal, 7 May 2004). 
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There may very well be no immediate solution to this problem. Authorisation 
essentially relies on states, whether granted by the Security Council or another body of 
the UN. Presently, sovereignty is still, in practice, regarded as an absolute concept by the 
majo1ity of states, especially in Asia and Africa. In 1999, Algerian President, Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika called sovereignty "our final defense against the rules of an unjust world" 
while speaking to the General Assembly in his capacity as head of the Organisation of 
Afiican Unity.156 Many states still perceive sovereignty in this way. It is only when the 
attitude of states will change that R2P will really be used as a justification for intervening 
to halt human 1ights abuses. Until then, the consent of the country concerned, or Security 
Council autho1isation, will still be necessary for any intervention unless an individual 
state is willing to risk intervening alone; Darfur illustrates that such a countiy will not be 
easily found. 
VII CONCLUSION 
With the world's largest peacekeeping force due to begin deployment in Darfur in 
October, 157 there may finally be hope for the millions of suffering Darfuris. However, 
Darfur, like Rwanda, seems to be an example of the unacceptable tardiness of the 
international community in responding to grave crises. Indeed, it may be that the 
international community will now speak of averting "the next Darfur". 
The concept of R2P has been accepted , in principle, by a wide range of actors in 
the international arena. 158 Even so , the conflict in Darfur demonstrates that this 
theoretical acceptance of R2P has not yet translated into practical application. 
This paper argued that the practical acceptance of R2P in the international 
community will depend on refonn of international practice, especially in the areas of 
156 Shashi Tharoor and Sam Daws "Humanitarian intervention: Getting Past the Reefs" (2001) 18 World 
Pol'y J 21 , 25 . 
157 UNSC Resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) S/RES/ 1769/2007. 
158 See intra N C International Acceptance ofR2P. 
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authorisation and deployment of troops. It has been concluded that the development of 
R2P into a rule of international law is largely dependant on the transformation of state 
perceptions of sovereignty. In this way, establishing different forms of authorisation may 
have little practical effect until states accept that their sovereignty is not absolute. This 
transfonnation may take years, or even decades, and it is clear that some states will need 
more convincing than others. In the inte1im, it may be that the true use in practice of R2P 
will be in its ability to persuade rogue governments to take responsibility for their citizens, 
or to agree to accept help from the international community. 
While the international community has clearly failed the "test case" of R2P, 159 all 
is not lost. The way forward for the doctrine is to first work on changing the no1mative 
perception of sovereignty. Only when the majo1ity of states accept the concept of 
"sovereignty as responsibility" 160 will R2P be able to take its place as a rule of 
international law. 
159 Lee Feinstein "Darfur and Beyond: What Is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities" Council on Foreign 
Relations (January 2007) www.cfr.org (accessed 9 August 2007) 38 . 
160 ICISS Repo11, above n 2, paras 2.14 - 2.15. 
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